Is the Strategy Working?

The international mission in Afghanistan faces a tough year ahead as more troops come to this land to counter the insurgency and provide security for development. But as Ann Marlowe points out in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, some elements of our strategy are lacking:

Fifth, and worst, Gen. McChrystal seems to be doing his best to hearten the insurgency and dismay Afghan progressives. Our commanding general told the Financial Times last week that the point of the surge was to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, rather than clearing and holding insurgent-ridden areas of Afghanistan.

Gen. McChrystal gets it wrong on other issues. He envisions Pakistan—a country that provides sanctuary to the Taliban—as a facilitator of talks, though most Afghans believe Pakistan is trying to destabilize their country. He imagines the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia—both the source of dubious charities that fund the insurgency—as venues for the talks. And he remarks that insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is "most likely to cut a deal," noting that he is a "former prime minister."

Hekmatyar is better known as a psychopath who began his political career by throwing acid in the faces of female students when he attended Kabul University in the 1970s. He's on our list of international terrorists and should be captured or killed—not negotiated with.

No surrender to the thugs. No negotiations with psychopaths. A future for Afghanistan will not be built by cutting deals with monsters.