Submission to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan

Submission
to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan: The
Honourable John Manley, Derek Burney, the Honourable Jake Epp, the
Honourable Paul Tellier, Pamela Wallin.

November 28, 2007.

Dear Panel Members:

The Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee is a recently-formed
association of Canadians from all walks of life who are united in a
commitment to the principle that as Canadians, we must honour our
obligations to the cause of solidarity with the people of Afghanistan.
This submission is our first public statement.

Among those who have agreed to lend their names to this initiative
(see appended) are people from the Left, and people from across the
political spectrum, including a former Liberal cabinet minister and
former lieutenant-governor, and two former Progressive Conservative
cabinet ministers. We are New Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, and
people of no particular political affiliation. We are Muslims, Jews,
Christians, and atheists. We are authors, journalists, academics, gay
rights activists, student activists, Afghan-Canadians, and feminists.

The Committee's position on Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, in
sum, is this: We must stay. Human rights are universal. The United
Nations calls for and expects Canada to remain dedicated to
Afghanistan's reconstruction and to the battle against terrorism there.
We recognize that a robust military engagement, with the UN's sanction
and the consent of the Government of Afghanistan, is vital and
necessary.

By the words "we must stay," we must clearly and explicitly oppose
Option 4 among the four options the Independent Panel has been charged
with considering, namely: "Withdraw all Canadian military forces from
Afghanistan after February 2009 except those required to provide
personal security for any remaining civilian employees."

Option 4 is an indefensible option from the perspective of Canada's
commitment to the universality of human rights and our country's proud
dedication to multilateralism. We recognize the conflict in Afghanistan
as a liberation struggle, waged by the Afghan people and their allies,
against oppression, against obscurantism, illiteracy, and the most
brutal forms of misogyny. It is a fight for democracy, and for peace,
order, and good government. It is also a struggle waged by the
sovereign Government of Afghanistan, a member state of the United
Nations, against illegal armed groups that seek to overturn the
democratic will of the Afghan people.

In Afghanistan, the great global struggle for the recognition and
protection of basic human rights – universal rights - is being waged
with a particular and necessary ferocity. We cannot and must not
retreat from that struggle.

The objective of extending and securing the sovereignty of the
Government of Afghanistan to all corners of that great country cannot
be achieved without a robust international military presence. Canada is
one the richest countries on earth, and as such we have absolutely no
excuse to shirk from our duty to make a proper and effective
contribution to that military engagement.

For the Government of Canada to adopt Option 4 as a convenient
policy response to what we concede is a great deal of confusion,
partisanship, anxiety and incoherence in the current "public debate"
about Afghanistan in Canada, would be a catastrophic abdication of
leadership.

Option 4 represents a rebuke to the United Nations, which
consistently calls upon those of its member states with soldiers in
Afghanistan to maintain and indeed increase their contributions to the
necessary military response to such "insurgent" groups as the Taliban
that operate there.

Further, Option 4 would reduce Canada – a country with one of the
best-equipped and most-experienced armed forces in NATO - to a weak,
junior partner in the International Security and Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces would be reduced to the
level of a group of security guards.

The members of the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee harbour a
range of reservations and misgivings over the proposed course of action
set out in Option 3, namely: "Shift the focus of Canadian military and
civilian security, development and governance efforts to another region
of Afghanistan."

We recognize that Canada, by its engagement in Kandahar – an area
where acute conditions of lawlessness and "insurgency" prevail - has
suffered greatly, and arguably disproportionately, in the terrible
death and injury of our soldiers there. We also recognize that there is
no shame in wanting another a NATO partner to relieve us of our
particular burden in Kandahar.

However, to simply abandon Canada's multi-faceted efforts in
Kandahar Province for "another region" would be a perilous and
precipitous decision. Also, Option 3's underlying but unspoken
assumption - that leaving Kandahar would leave Canadian soldiers more
safe from harm – is very likely to be a false assumption. Option 3 also
appears to be based at least partly upon the untested notion that there
is another NATO partner ready to assume the lead role in Kandahar, and
that a new NATO partner could simply pick up in Kandahar, successfully
and effectively, where Canada left off.

Anti-democratic and illegal armed groups in Afghanistan are not now
confined to Kandahar, and there is no reason to assume that the forces
now operating in Kandahar would simply remain in that Province and
leave the rest of country free from harm should Canada merely "shift"
its efforts elsewhere. Just as likely, Kandahar itself could become the
kind of "safe haven" currently associated with certain border regions
in Pakistan.

In considering Option 3, we strongly urge panel members to bear in
mind the risk of squandering Canada's efforts that option threatens
(and as should be obvious, this point also pertains to Option 4), not
least is the blood Canadians have shed in Kandahar. It would also be
unrealistic to imagine that the priceless and irreplaceable expertise
and experience Canadians have developed in Kandahar Province will
necessarily accrue to a NATO successor in the turmoil of the vacuum we
would leave behind there.

Because we acknowledge that a robust Canadian military engagement is
vital and necessary, and is expected of our country by both the United
Nations and the Government of Afghanistan, we see little merit in
Option 2: "Focus on development and governance in Kandahar, with
sufficient military to provide effective protection for our civilians
engaged in development and governance efforts. This would require
another country (or countries) to provide a military force sufficient
to ensure the necessary security in which such efforts can take place
in Kandahar province."

While this option at least anticipates a continuance of Canada's
development-and-governance efforts in Kandahar, built upon Canada's
leadership in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Option
2 nonetheless may result in a combination of the untenable aspects of
Option 4 with the unrealistic expectations of Option 3.

Similarly, we discern what we fear is a fatal flaw in Option 1:
"Train, support and develop the Afghan army and police towards a
self-sustaining capacity in Kandahar Province, with a phased withdrawal
of Canadian troops starting in February 2009 consistent with progress
towards this objective."

Nevertheless, the mandate of the Independent Panel on Canada's
Future Role in Afghanistan allows the Panel to consider each of the
aforementioned options "without intending to exclude
others."Consequently, we urge you to consider Option 1 as a starting
point, amended appropriately, and as the basis for the Panel's
recommendations to government.

We wholeheartedly support the proposition that Canada and its NATO
partners should rededicate and enhance efforts to "train, support and
develop" the Afghan Army and the Afghan National Police, in Kandahar
Province, and elsewhere in Afghanistan. But there are fundamental
problems with a commitment to a "phased withdrawal" by 2009, and the
terminology "consistent with progress" is too vague to be of use.

The problems with Option 1 that we would like panel members to acknowledge and address by amendment are twofold.

The first is that, as written, Option 1 is based largely on wishful
thinking, and to a lesser extent, bureaucratic convenience. There is
compelling evidence to suggest that neither the Afghan Army nor the
Afghan National Police, individually or in combination, will be capable
of standing on their own by 2009, sufficient to match the security and
counter-insurgency capacity Canada is providing in Kandahar Province –
a capacity which in itself is arguably insufficient to the challenge at
hand.

By all the evidence available to us, we see no cause for Canada to
consider planning for a phased withdrawal of troops from Kandahar, as
anticipated by Option 1, at any date before 2011.

The Afghanistan Compact, to which Canada and roughly 50 other
nations are signatories, sets "by end-2010" as the date for a variety
of benchmarks for "a nationally respected, professional, ethnically
balanced" Afghan National Army, fully established, democratically
accountable, organized and trained, adequately equipped, sufficient to
maintain Afghanistan's national security, and meeting several more
standards, including troop levels.

"By end-2010" is the benchmark for a variety of other objectives set
out in the Afghan Compact that include targets for the Afghan National
Police, the Afghan Border Police, the disbandment of illegal armed
groups, the elimination of the illegal opium trade, meeting
Afghanistan's obligations under the Ottawa Convention on landmines, and
so on.

While Canada's specific commitment to leading the Kandahar
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) carries no direct obligation
beyond 2009, we argue that it is the end of 2010, and certainly not
before, that Canada should set as an appropriate time to review its
overall military commitments in Afghanistan. Canada should make its
troop commitment decisions contingent upon measurable progress as set
out in the relevant provisions of the Afghanistan Compact., rather than
merely "consistent with" progress.

Specific Observations

1. Negotiating with the "Taliban."

Much has been made of the prospects for negotiating with the Taliban
as a new and imaginative approach to peace in Afghanistan. That
prospect must be situated in its factual and historical context.

Firstly, although the Canadian Forces may negotiate the surrender of
armed criminals our soldiers happen to engage, Canada is not entitled
to trespass on the sovereignty of Afghanistan by negotiating with
illegal armed groups in the absence of Afghan government direction.

Secondly, the Afghan government, with the assistance of Canada and
other of its partners in a United Nations initiative, had already
negotiated the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of roughly
56,000 former combatants well before the idea of negotiating with the
Taliban came into vogue.

Thirdly, Afghan president Hamid Karzai has been clear from the
outset of his term of office that he is prepared to negotiate with any
armed group that is prepared to lay down its weapons. Indeed, President
Karzai has engaged representatives of illegal armed groups directly in
discussions.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, while there is scant evidence
that the Taliban's hard-core jihadist leadership is interested in any
such entreaties, Canada can and should demand that the Government of
Afghanistan should not under any circumstances contravene its
international commitments by "negotiating out" the rights of women in
any talks with the Taliban, or in the establishment of any
power-sharing agreement.

2. A distinct Canadian approach.

Canada is a sovereign nation and must make every effort to determine
its own distinct contribution to the United Nations' efforts to
reconstruct Afghanistan and assist the Afghan government in extending
the rule of law throughout the country. We must take particular care to
confront the misapprehension that Canada's role in Afghanistan is
simply the function of an alliance with the United States of America.

It is not just that this is untrue. It is also a misapprehension
that has severely inhibited the vigorous and necessary debate in Canada
about what our policy options in Afghanistan can and should be. It is a
misrepresentation of Canada's purposes and objectives in Afghanistan,
and it has cast a cloud over Canada's role as an independent member of
NATO and as a member of the UN's International Security and Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Further, Canada would be well advised to distance itself from the
United States' Operation Enduring Freedom owing to the association of
that operation with the unnecessary deaths of Afghan civilians. Canada
would also benefit from a more transparent disassociation from the
costly and counterproductive opium-eradication program as currently
prosecuted under American leadership.

We recognize that the suppression of the opium trade is an objective
of the Afghanistan Compact and is strongly supported by the Government
of Afghanistan. But Canada would be of greater assistance to the Afghan
government, and perhaps especially to the impoverished farmers of
Kandahar, if we expended more effort in the identification of more
practical and effective solutions to the problem of illegal opium
production, and alternatives to illegal opium production. We defer to
the Senlis Council, the Agha Khan Foundation and other civil-society
and aid organizations who are working on these solutions.

3. Development aid and reconstruction initiatives.

While these aspects of Canada's engagement are not specific to the
mandate of the Independent Panel, development and diplomacy are
nonetheless inextricably linked to the defence aspects of Canada's
Afghan mission. It is clear that the Canadian Forces must play a direct
role in development efforts in the volatile Kandahar Province.

Canada should increase or at the very least maintain current levels
of funding support for the Afghan Government, the United Nations in
Afghanistan, and international non-government organizations. Canada
should also demonstrate a heightened commitment to the direct
engagement of Afghan people, and Afghan civil society institutions, in
development and reconstruction initiatives.

The federal government must also make far greater efforts to ensure
that Canadians are fully informed of the development and reconstruction
work undertaken in their name in Afghanistan.

We should also point out that the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity
Committee does not confine itself to advocating on government policy
alone. We look to the Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan (W4WA) as
an example of the kind of concrete solidarity that Canadians as
individuals, as students, as trade unionists, and as members of
civil-society organizations can offer the people of Afghanistan.

The W4WA, a volunteer organization, has raised $2 million since
1996, which has employed hundreds of teachers in Afghanistan and has
provided for the purchase of books, the expenses of an orphanage,
medical supplies, school guards, cooks, and so on.

General Observations

Those of us who formulated the idea of the Canada-Afghanistan
Solidarity Committee did so with an understanding that a progressive,
internationalist, and idealistic Canadian policy must also be realistic
and cautious. We saw that there was no short-term solution to
Afghanistan's problems.

While terms such as "exit strategy" and "Canada's traditional
peacekeeping role" are commonplace in the lexicon of Canada's debates
over the Afghanistan question, what is regrettably less evident is the
recognition that exit strategies must be adaptive and contingent upon
real-world events, and responsive to measurable progress.

Afghanistan's problems are both global and regional, and they must
be understood in their geopolitical context. It is trite to say "there
is no military solution" in Afghanistan - no one is arguing that there
is. But "peacekeeping" is not an option. There are well-armed
anti-government combatants, both foreign and domestic, actively waging
war in Afghanistan. So, there are no truce lines to patrol, there is no
ceasefire to monitor, and there is no "traditional" peacekeeping role
to which Canada might return there. There is no peace to keep.

It should also be remembered that Canada's peacekeeping commitments,
like our commitment in Afghanistan, have been often bloody affairs that
have cost the lives of many Canadians soldiers. Canada's peacekeeping
missions have also rarely been short-term engagements, with handily
scheduled "exit strategies." Our role in Cyprus alone involved the
commitment of a full battalion, from 1964 to 1993.

It is not just the absence of clarity that has confounded what
should be a thoughtfully argued, historic national debate about
Canada's role in Afghanistan. The debate has also been corroded by
partisanship and political point-scoring, and the multilateral basis of
Canada's commitment in Afghanistan has been eclipsed by an unseemly
preoccupation with the American interests and intentions in
Afghanistan, both real and imaginary. Canada's Afghan engagement is a
life-and death matter, a question of pressing national and
international importance, and yet the debate has been infantilized by a
wholly false context, with its own invented hierarchy of virtue, from
"anti-war" down to "pro-war."

This has eclipsed the most important questions - questions about how
Canada can most concretely, effectively and efficiently show support
and solidarity with the people of Afghanistan – people who have
undergone the most horrific suffering and hardship over the past few
decades. It in is those questions, and in that context, that we urge
the members of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in
Afghanistan to see the task before them.

The Independent Panel is in a unique position to plainly set out
what is truly at stake in the options its members have been asked to
consider. This panel has an opportunity to change the tone, tenor and
substance of the Afghanistan debate in Canada. We urge the Independent
Panel to situate the aspirations and interests of the Afghan people
themselves directly at the centre of its deliberations.

A commitment to Afghanistan that is consistent with Canada's best
traditions, Canada's international reputation, and Canada's values,
will require of Canadians a much deeper understanding of and
familiarity with and respect for the Afghan people. What's necessary to
that purpose is a clear understanding of what it is that ordinary
Afghans think, and what ordinary Afghans say, about our role there.

The picture of Afghanistan that tends to emerge in the Canadian news
media, inadvertently but nonetheless unfairly, unjustifiably and
inaccurately, is of a nation that is inherently violent, irredeemably
backward, and incorrigibly hostile to "the west." In fact, there is
much that Canada shares with Afghanistan. Like Canada, Afghanistan is
linguistically and ethnically diverse. Like Afghanistan, Canada not so
long ago emerged from the shadow of empire. Canadians, too, only slowly
gathered to themselves the fully sovereign jurisdiction over their own
affairs, and it was only very recently that Canada devised a written
constitutional basis for representative democracy and individual rights.

Canadians now share something with Afghans that is of a much greater
consequence than vital trade relations, or profound historical ties, or
deeply-shared and long-standing cultural affiliations. Canadians have
shed blood in Afghanistan, fighting for its dignity and its freedom. We
share that with the Afghan people, and it is not something to treat
lightly.

Canadian politicians and opinion-makers, and the members of this
panel, would be well served to follow the example of the Canadian
Forces' civil-military cooperation units that routinely meet in shura
with Afghan villagers. By that example, we mean a practice of close and
careful attention to what the Afghan people themselves have to say
about their needs and priorities, and a policy of being directly guided
by those findings in the options we adopt.

To be uninformed and uninterested in what Afghans say about
Canada's presence in their country, and to rely solely on Canadian
public opinion as a guide for specific policy options in Afghanistan,
is to engage in a fatal narcissism.

Owing to the preponderance of recently-gathered and
readily-available evidence, we no longer have any excuse to be
uninformed about what the Afghan people themselves say about their own
needs and priorities. The evidence is available in the form of a dozen
separate focus group analyses, issue-specific surveys, and major
national and regional public opinion polls, all undertaken in
Afghanistan. The evidence comes also in the form of the Afghan people's
democratic will as expressed by their own constitutionally elected
government.

The evidence is plain. The vast majority of the Afghan people, in
their own voices, and through their own government, in its
international commitments, say this: Stay. Human rights are universal.
Canada should remain dedicated to Afghanistan's reconstruction, and to
the battle against terrorism. A robust military engagement, with the
UN''s sanction and the consent of the Government of Afghanistan, is
vital and necessary.

While we do not purport to be "experts" in military strategy or
foreign relations, we are citizens of a democracy, and as such we claim
standing to address ourselves to these matters.

What we can say without any hesitation is that Canada cannot and
must not simply wash its hands of Afghanistan. We must stand with the
embryonic Afghan democracy against its enemies, and we must do this
simply because we can do this. The opportunity has presented itself,
and came to us unbidden, in September, 2001. To refuse the opportunity
would be to turn our backs on everything that Canadians have ever
claimed to stand for and believe in.

Although we are but one country among the 37 nations participating
in the UN's International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan,
Canada is major, leading contributor.

Any careless lessening of our resolve could easily run the risk of
plunging Afghanistan back into total civil war. We would also risk
emboldening the enemies of democracy the world round, not least of whom
are those who continue to prey upon the proud Afghan people - the armed
enemies of women, of literacy, of free speech, and of peace.

We should stay.

Appendix: Afghan Opinion

A limited overview of trends discerned from Afghan public opinion
surveys can be found in The Clingendael Institute, Department For
International Development: "Media, Public Opinion, and Peace
Conditionalities in Post-Conflict Afghanistan -A study into local views
on donor behaviour." The Netherlands, December, 2005.
http://c4o.unitycode.org/me/PeaceConditionalities.final.20060413.pdf
1.Center for Economic and Social Rights: "Human Rights and Reconstruction in Afghanistan." May, 2002. http://cesr.org/node/499
2. National Democratic Institute of International Affairs: "Afghan
Perspectives on Democracy: A Report on Focus Groups in the Kabul Area
on the Eve of the Emergency Loya Jirga." May, 2002. http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1411_af_report_052802.pdf
3. Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC): "Speaking Out: Afghan
Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities." November, 2003.
http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/women/HRCspeakingOut.pdf
4. National Democratic Institute of International Affairs: "A Society
in Transition: Focus Group Discussions in Afghanistan." December, 2003.
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1677_af_focusgroups_120103.pdf
5. Asia Foundation / Afghan Media Resource Center: "Democracy In Afghanistan." July 13, 2004.
http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/afghan_voter-ed04.pdf
6. Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC): "Take the
Guns Away: Afghan Voices on Security and Elections." September, 2004.
http://www.afghanadvocacy.org/documents/TaketheGunsAwayEnglish.pdf
7.Center for Strategic and International Studies: "Voices of a New Afghanistan." June 14, 2005.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/press/ma_2005_0715.pdf
8. ABC News Poll: "Life in Afghanistan." December 7, 2005.
http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/998a1Afghanistan.pdf
9. Program on International Policy Attitudes (University of Maryland) /
D3 Systems / Afghan Center for Social and Opinion Research, Kabul:
"Poll of Afghanistan." January 11, 2006 .
http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/jan06/Afghanistan_Jan06_quaire.pdf
10. Asia Foundation / Afghan Center for Social and Opinion Research: "A
Survey of the Afghan People." (Reportedly the single largest and most
comprehensive public opinion poll conducted in Afghan history).
November 9, 2006.
http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf
11. Human Rights Watch: "The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan." April, 2007.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/afghanistan0407web.pdf
12. Environics / D3 Systems / Afghan Centre for Social and Opinion Research: "2007 Survey of Afghans." October 18, 2007.
Environics_2007_Survey_of_Afghans_methodology.pdf